Is maritime piracy the next destabilising factor for the Middle East

Stefano Betti examines the newly announced Prosperity Guardian and what it means for piracy in the Middle East

Photo: Sailors assigned to US Coast Guard Maritime Safety & Security Team signal a Somali skiff with suspected pirates to raise their hands before boarding | US Navy photo 

On December 19, 2023, the US Defence Secretary announced the creation of Prosperity Guardian, a new American-led naval operation aimed at countering the wave of drones and anti-ship missiles used by Houthi militias to attack merchant ships passing through the Red Sea. Nine countries, mostly from the Western hemisphere, have joined the initiative so far. There are still many issues to be defined, including the degree and extent of the participation of individual countries. The ability of the new operation to deter the Houthis from pursuing their attacks (which are already causing significant damage to global trade) will depend on many factors. One crucial aspect will be the decision on whether or not to strike land-based launching pads.

It is undoubtedly premature to make predictions about the success of Prosperity Guardian. However, it is not too early to ask if, alongside current drone attacks, we should expect a resurgence of ‘classic’ forms of piracy, characterised by the hijacking of merchant ships with consequent hostage-taking and ransom demands.

Paradoxically, the effectiveness of this operation could lead to an expansion of the theatre of hostilities by means of well-tested acts of piracy, the number of which has drastically dropped in recent years (at least in this region) to the point of almost disappearing. Under this scenario, piracy would thus add to the hybrid range of tools used by state and non-state actors in the current Middle East war context to wear down the front of the USA and its allies.

To assess the concrete risk of this happening, a few factors should be considered: First, from a purely operational point of view, one can wonder if the new scenario and the consequent military effort required by the new naval operation will effectively force the participating countries to redeploy resources currently engaged in the Western Indian Ocean for anti-piracy purposes (for instance, the EU naval task force operating under Operation Atalanta). Depending on the extent of this resource reallocation, pirates might create and take advantage of an ‘enforcement gap.’

Secondly, on December 14, 2023, a Maltese-flagged merchant ship (the Ruen) was hijacked by Somali pirates and is currently anchored off the coast of Somalia. Eighteen crew members have been taken hostage, and one has been evacuated for medical reasons. At the time of writing, the identity and demands of the hijackers remain unknown. Nearby naval forces and the Somali authorities are closely monitoring the situation. It is significant that the incident occurred only a few days after the attempted hijacking of the MV Central Park in the waters north of Somalia, a chemical tanker managed by a company owned by Israel's Ofer family. The pirates abandoned the ship in response to the crew's distress call, but a US warship captured them. Interestingly, the Pentagon indicated that they were not Houthis, as expected, but Somali pirates. Again, it is too early to conclude that these two incidents will inaugurate a trend, and it is hoped that they will remain isolated cases, but the fact remains that there has not been a successful act of piracy in the region since 2017. 

Is it just a coincidence that this is happening at a time of extremely high geopolitical tension in the area? Some commentators are suggesting that pirates are simply taking advantage of the chaotic environment to resume their criminal operations, but it cannot presently be excluded that these acts fit into the current scenario at a deeper level.

Thirdly, in the years when piracy off the coast of Somalia was at its peak – roughly between 2007 and 2012 – cases of collaboration were reported between pirate financiers and members of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group Al-Shabaab. The World Bank conducted an intriguing study in 2013 that estimated the ransom demanded between April 2005 and December 2012 to be between US$339 and US$413 million. Unexpectedly, the study found that proceeds from piracy crimes were most commonly invested in the development of militias and political influence. 

With this backdrop, the question that now arises is: How has the relationship between Al-Shabaab militias and the piracy ecosystem evolved more recently? Is it possible that instances of ad hoc co-operation have solidified into something resembling a strategic partnership? This question intersects with another one, namely the type of relationship that Somali pirates have established in recent years with Houthi militias after largely abandoning piracy and dedicating themselves to other criminal activities, including human and arms trafficking between Yemen and the African continent. Is it possible that the Al-Shabaab-Houthi militias-ex-Somali pirates triangle has acquired a strategic connotation, reactivating the willingness of the latter to resume piracy operations as an additional tool of geopolitical pressure in the broader context of the ongoing Middle East conflict? Since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict, Al-Shabaab has adopted a highly belligerent tone while making the most of the opportunities provided by social media, first to draw comparisons between Gaza and Somalia and later to coax attention, increase, and support its recruiting efforts.

Last but not least, some of the legal tools that have proven crucial in countering piracy in the Western Indian Ocean are no longer available. Since January 1, 2023, for example, the Indian Ocean, including the Gulf of Aden, has been removed from the high-risk area for piracy as defined by the shipping industry. A year earlier, the UN Security Council decided not to renew the authorisation that it had granted (and renewed annually) since 2008 to allow countries and regional organisations co-operating with the Somali government to enter Somalia’s territorial waters for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The non-renewal of this authorisation has raised some alarm, including with the EU, which contended that without access to Somalia's territorial waters, the ability of Operation Atalanta (formerly the European Union Naval Force) to carry out counter-piracy activities in the region will be ‘crippled.’ 

During the same period, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce stated that although no incidents were reported since the start of 2022, the threat of piracy was still present in the Southern Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden, including the Yemen and Somali coasts. The IMB noted: “Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents, and all merchant ships are advised to adhere to the recommendations in the latest best management practices while transiting in these waters.” With this in mind, one may wonder if the reduced ability of countries’ naval forces to operate in Somali territorial waters with the same level of effectiveness and agility as before may act as an additional incentive for pirates to return to using those waters as a safe rear area to prepare their attacks and seek refuge afterwards.