Is Europe prepared for Russian threats?
CRJ’s Advisory Panel member Matt Minshall looks at the need for the UK and Europe to strengthen their defence and strategic readiness in response to Russia’s ongoing destabilisation of Europe.
Image by Freepik
In international affairs, there are critical incidents which need urgent attention. They include all matters affecting humanity, from climate change to state aggression, and are often described as wake-up calls for action. Some become the supposedly definitive ‘step too far’. However, many of the calls are subdued by the snooze button, and many oversteps become just another step.
There are currently many global activities in contravention of human decency and international law, all of which cause suffering or injustice, and many have regional and global effects. The one that has the greatest effect on global stability is the war by Russia on Europe and wider, running concurrent to the invasion of Ukraine.
The starting point is to try to look at Putin’s aims. There are three aspects which have been a theme of his wider narrative since 2022: a need to expand control to enhance security; to recover former Russian territories; and to reunite the three branches of the greater Russian nation – Great Russia, Little Russia, and White Russia. The second two are useful for ideological rhetoric, but carry little weight. The first is the real aim and may have already started to have significant success. The outcome will depend on the resolve to understand fully the intent and to counter the potentially catastrophic outcome through unity and resolve.
The 2014 annexation of the Crimea was considered by many as a step too far for Putin. However, as that step was not blocked, it emboldened the use of military-grade chemical weapons in the UK, the destabilisation of former European colonies in Africa, overt interference with elections in Europe and the US, cyber espionage, the full invasion of Ukraine and, most recently, blatant drone attacks on NATO member states and acts of sabotage.
There also appears to be evidence of Russia amplifying and inflaming the anti-immigration sentiments, such as the recent protests in the UK, according to the Royal United Services Institute. There are also open accusations of ‘massive Russian interference’ following the recent elections in Moldova.
By these actions, Putin has managed disruption, fear, and discord in the camps of those he considers a threat to Russian security. Unless this is deterred, prevented, and, if necessary, punished, he may well already be on the road to success. This is supported by former UK MI5 chief Baroness Manningham-Buller, who said we may already be at war with Russia, citing that a rise in cyberattacks, sabotage and covert operations showed that Britain had entered a ‘new kind of conflict’ with Moscow. This public acknowledgement defining what no one has previously enunciated may be the key to preventing the all-out war that Putin is pushing the world towards. However, whether he is able to fully realise this or not is uncertain. As a former middle-ranking KGB officer, he does not have the strategic understanding of his actions, making them more dangerous but, with the analysis of his recent actions, predictable.
In CRJ 20:2, an article made comparisons to the response to Russia’s actions with the appeasement of the 1930s when every wake-up call was ignored and every step too far went unchecked. This finally emboldened Germany to invade Poland, triggering WWII.
It is fervently hoped that history will not record WWIII beginning with an attack on Poland. Whether it is played down or not, the fact is that Polish and NATO forces scrambled to intercept Russian drones which entered Poland’s airspace early on September 9, 2025. This marks the first direct military engagement with Moscow since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
It was followed by a Russian drone breaching Romania’s airspace on September 14, 2025, the second NATO country to report such an incursion, and later, Oslo and Copenhagen airports in Denmark were closed due to drone attacks. These attacks have been linked to the activities of a Russian shadow-fleet ship, the Boracay. Following a passage from the Baltic, positioning it close enough to be implicated in nine drone attacks, the ship ended up near Saint Nazaire, where it was raided by the French authorities on September 29.
Since NATO’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked nine times. Notably, all incidents have been in the twenty-first century. Five have been directly over concerns about Russian aggression and two connected to Russian activity in support of the Syrian regime. The most recent have been from Poland and Estonia, in September 2025, and Denmark is considering this option for the first time in its history.
The incursions into NATO’s airspace clearly illustrate a key part of Russia’s war on Europe, which is aggressive provocation risking or forcing escalation. The Kremlin is deliberately testing NATO and especially European resolve. However, Putin has embarked on the path of no return. Any cessation or diminution will be seen as failure, not least of face, which may dilute his support from China and those who might seize the opportunity to attempt regime change from within. Each incident increases the risk of a miscalculation, narrowing the room for manoeuvre that could turn a limited incident into an all-out conventional war, which he cannot win and entering a new nuclear age is a likely escalation.
A conventional war is something the Kremlin probably prefers to avoid, as it knows its military capability limitations, clearly marked in history. For instance, in the case of Afghanistan in 1979, there was a severe lack of complex military capability – a grave error that contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union. A direct reflection of their capability was the vast army of Iraq, equipped and trained by the Soviet Union, and their defeat to US and European forces in 1991.
When Russia began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it intended victory within a few weeks, but after three years, it has effectively achieved little aside from minor territorial gain. The stated goal has not been accomplished, and Moscow is working on concurrent goals and a different timeline.
An aspect the US and some European politicians may not have retained is the deep dissimilarity in European and Russian cultures, fundamentally rooted in different attitudes towards the value of life. Western European societies prioritise the sanctity of life as well as individual rights and shape their political and military doctrines correspondingly. NATO and European solidarity have been tested and divergent responses have shown the weakness of the liberal West in Russian eyes. The losses, while substantial in Western terms, are not considered so by the Kremlin for which manpower is a consumable, and equipment may be bought or manufactured at relative cheapness. This divergence creates a profound challenge for Europeans seeking to engage with or deter Russian aggression, as assumptions about shared values often prove misplaced.
Despite these overt acts of subversion and aggression, the US appears to have been duped up until recently by the Russian pretence of a desire for peace, resulting in confidence in Trump’s support of NATO. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, ‘uncertainty about the US commitment and the magnitude and timing of a prospective direct Russian threat should be the watchword of European security.’
One of the biggest enemies of European cohesion is political discord. The current rise of extremism in Europe has a disturbing rhyme with the 1920s and 1930s. In Spain, it led to the Civil War, seen as a microcosm of the confrontation between Hitler’s fascism and Stalin’s communism. Fascist control of the country remained in effect well into the 1970s and the legacy is still being felt today. The sentiments of the extreme right movements in Europe now resonate with those of fascism, with racial purity, traditionalist, but outdated conservatism, and anti-liberal dogma showing clearly under a thin veneer of quasi-patriotic spin. Should this nationalist friction be allowed full rein and Europe descend into ideological war? If so, Russia will not need to fight to take over, and the fact that Russia is overtly supporting the rise of such destructive tendencies should be a clear message of its direction and implications.
The United Kingdom stands at a pivotal moment in its strategic defence history. It may prove to be the key which keeps Europe from being subsumed by Russian aggression and expansionism. This is possible through its partial independence from Europe, both physically and politically, and the enduring special relationship with the US, which may act as a conduit for cohesiveness and support.
However, holding this position requires more than diplomacy; it demands a defence posture capable of responding to evolving threats. Europe is finally rearming for the first time since the considerable defence drawdown, which began at the end of the Cold War. Defence budgets are rising and at the NATO Summit, allies committed to increasing defence spending to five per cent of GDP, more than double the original target of two per cent.
This message was clearly reflected at DSEI 2025, an international defence and security event held in London, UK. The goal was to not simply respond to crises, but also actively build a more resilient, innovative, and capable defence posture for the future. During the event, new warship concepts were unveiled, designed for ‘incremental spiral development and progressive transition into the future air warfare capability’.
The Chief of the Naval Staff reinforced this message, stating: “The Royal Navy must be able to deliver firepower and protection at scale…with fewer people and greater agility. Our adversaries are not waiting for us to catch up….” The UK Ministry of Defence recently awarded a substantial contract for air-deployable state-of-the-art medium-range air defence missile launchers, doubling the number of deployable systems operated by the armed forces. This rapid procurement and deployment may be a sign that Britain is moving from strategy to action.
Looking ahead, the stakes could not be higher, but the opportunity to succeed is also clear and available with the courage to take it. As with WWIII, the war in Ukraine has shown that the cost of complacency is an entirely different future. Britain’s response is increasingly defined by optimism, partnership, and a willingness to embrace change.